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NARCISSISM AS ETHICAL PRACTICE?: FOUCAULT, ASKESIS AND AN 
ETHICS OF BECOMING 
 
ABSTRACT 
The emergence of the auto/biographical society brings with it fears of a drift towards 
a culture of narcissism in which the mutuality and ethicality of collective life may be 
eclipsed in favour of a self-indulgent `aesthetics of existence’.  This paper focuses on 
auto/biographical practice and regards it as a quintessential `technology of the self’ in 
the Foucauldian sense.   However, and paradoxically, this positions auto/biography 
within a thesis which emphasises the constitution of the self as a project of aesthetic 
inscription which poses dangers for ethicality and commitment to public life.  The 
notion that an aesthetic disposition is ethically indispensable is as intriguing as it is 
contentious.  The paper explores this problematic through the lens of Foucauldian 
ethics; a critical (re-)examination of the character of our aesthetic investments in the 
practice of reading and writing auto/biography, suggests the potential for realising a 
different kind of ethical relation to ourselves and others.  These issues are explicated 
by reference to the popular cultural text, Dead Man Walking – an auto/biographical 
narrative which is explicitly `aestheticised’ as entertainment. 
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NARCISSISM AS ETHICAL PRACTICE?: FOUCAULT, ASKESIS AND AN ETHICS 
OF BECOMING1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Amongst its many legacies, the `narrative turn’ has reinvigorated critical thinking of 
the ontology of `the self’, and in this regard has propelled auto/biographical studies 
into the heart of contemporary sociologies of identity/subjectivity.  There is little doubt 
that auto/biography has become an important resource and topic for theorising and 
conceptualising different selves, how they are constructed and composed from varied 
socio-political, historical and cultural sites, and how they connect and engage with 
others, both similarly and differentially located in time and space.  Yet, as Plummer 
(2001) puts it, there may be a `dark side’ to this success story with fears that the 
exponential growth in the production, consumption and academicisation of 
auto/biographical work reinforces and intensifies what Lasch (1979) describes as a 
`narcissistic culture’ of self-absorbed individuals with no sense of shared morality, 
collective responsibility or commitment to public life.  Such pessimism is further 
buttressed by a contemporary flirtation with postmodernism, which works to 
undermine the possibility of political intervention founded on a universal ethics.  It 
seems paradoxical, therefore, to turn to a postmodern analytic to rethink the potential 
for ethical reflexivity in auto/biographical practice. Suppose we accept as axiomatic 
the notion of auto/biography as a `technology of the self’ in the Foucauldian sense.  
This, then, positions auto/biography within a thesis which emphasises the 
constitution of the self as a project of aesthetic inscription and ethical (self-)formation.  
The idea that an aesthetic disposition is ethically indispensable is as intriguing as it is 
contentious, not least because it challenges the Habermasian notion of the separate 
spheres of the `cognitive’, the `ethico-political’ and the `libidinal-aesthetic’ (Eagleton, 
1990 cited in Bennett, 1996: 657).  However, to examine the character of our 
aesthetic investments in the practice of reading and writing auto/biography at least 
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opens up the possibility for realising a different kind of ethical relation to ourselves 
and others.   
 
 
AGAINST AESTHETICS 
We pay for our commitment to individuality by incurring the dangers of lives 
floundering in capricious subjectivism, the pursuit of arbitrary whims, the loss of real 
selves in unrealistic dreams, and by cutting mistakenly the life giving interaction 
between self-formation and responsible cultivation of our given social and cultural 
world.  Only the future can show whether the price is too high and whether we can live 
responsibly with the ideal of the self. (Weintraub, 1978: 379) 
 
This eloquent observation captures very well the (perceived) socio-cultural dangers 
of the `autobiographical society’. Yet, at what point does `creative individuality’ cease 
to refine our knowledge and understanding of the world; under what conditions does 
‘life giving interaction’ degenerate into `capricious subjectivism’; and why should 
these processes be understood as necessarily regressive ones?  Equally, what 
marks the passage from socially accountable practices of `self-formation’, 
`responsible cultivation’ and `giving each man his due’ to a hedonism based on the 
self-interested `pursuit of arbitrary whims’ and `unrealistic dreams’? It seems to me 
that the movement to the `dark side’ suggested by Weintraub is also represented as 
a movement across an (imagined) boundary between `truth-seeking rational enquiry’ 
and `ethico-political discourse’ on the one hand, and `aesthetic values’ on the other 
(Norris, 1992: 163).  This positions what could otherwise be construed as the 
parochial concern of auto/biographical studies, within a wider philosophical debate on 
the relationship between the cognitive, ethical and aesthetic realms of human 
experience – in Habermasian terms, the mutually exclusive spheres of science, 
morality and art.  
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One of the many contributions of postmodern theories of the aesthetic is to eschew 
the modernist separation of the spheres and to restore to the centre of socio-political 
life the affective, sensual and spectacular dimensions of human existence.  Such a 
perspective draws on an explicitly Nietzschean worldview in which the aesthetic 
attitude governs all spheres of life, including the ethical.  As Wolin points out, in 
Nietzschean ethics, actions are deemed as ethical if they demonstrate a will or force 
which is `glorious, sensational or dramatic ….. patterned after a dramaturgical model 
…(and) valued solely as a performative gesture’ (1986: 74 Emphasis in original).  
Largely regarded as Nietzsche’s heir, Foucault’s later works on ethics (Foucault, 
1984a, 1985, 1986, 1989a, 1989b) and his elaboration of an `aesthetics of 
existence’, are said to be indicative of his tendency to `pan-aestheticism’ and a 
perspective which  
 
…. favors either an attitude of narcissistic self-absorption or one of outwardly directed, 
aggressive self-aggrandizement.  In neither case is there a discernible trace of human 
solidarity, mutuality or fellow-feeling.  Instead the ethical universe of aesthetic 
decisionism is a Hobbesian state of nature … with a flair for style (Wolin, 1986:85). 
 
Eagleton, likewise, is highly sceptical of Foucault’s ethical theses arguing that from 
within such a schema `(e)verything should now become aesthetic,  Truth, the 
cognitive, becomes that which satisfies the mind … Morality is converted to a matter 
of style, pleasure and intuition …. (of) turning oneself into an artifact’ (1990: 368).  
Indeed, as Vintges suggests `(n)otoriously, the issue in the debate around Foucault’s 
work is its lack of an ethics’ (2001: 166 original emphasis). For Thacker, Foucault 
`has difficulty with questions of normativity’ (1993: 13) and fails to establish normative 
criteria for distinguishing between `good’ and ‘bad’ kinds of aesthetic practice.  Fraser 
(1994) accuses Foucault of being a `moral nihilist’; and Eagleton charges him with 
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espousing `a subject-centred morality with a vengeance’ (1990: 394). More potently, 
he argues that Foucault’s emphasis on the aesthetic conceals brutality and coercive 
power behind a cloak of beautiful, self-delighting forms; and asks, `(w)hat would a 
stylish rape look like, precisely?’ (ibid: 394).  At the same time, feminist critics (such 
as Balbus, 1985; Diamond and Quinby, 1988; Hartsock, 1990; Sawacki, 1991), keen 
to apply Foucault’s ethics to questions of `aesthetic embodiment’ - dieting, exercise 
and body-building, for example – argue that such `self-surveillance is a form of 
obedience to patriarchy’ (Bartky, 1988: 81), and conclude that Foucault crucially fails 
to address how normative judgements of self-fashioned, aestheticised bodies are 
always-already produced within a field of power relations. This is similar to Dews’ 
complaint that `Foucault wishes to avoid judging power-knowledge complexes from a 
normative standpoint’ (1989: 37); and, again, Best and Kellner (1991) object to 
Foucault’s inattention to structures of domination, hegemony and inequality, claiming 
that the aesthetic turn encourages a `micropolitics of desire’ rather than collective 
forms of resistance guided by an ethics of social justice.   
 
On these readings, the boundary between the aesthetic domain and other spheres of 
life is completely erased; and under conditions of this kind of aesthetic imperialism, 
ethical convention and political obligation are repressed, expelled and then banished 
altogether. As a framework for thinking about and responding to the dangers of 
auto/biography’s narcissistic `dark side’, Foucault (it seems) offers us only a one way 
ticket to an auto/biographical world of spectacular drama and grandiose sentiments 
in which auto/biography per se would be nothing more than a narrativised, personal 
soundbite.  However, this is to read Foucault narrowly and in a way which glosses 
over the finer points of his thesis which, far from representing aesthetics as the Other 
to ethics (and cognition), makes a persuasive theoretical case for thinking about their 
dialogical and dialectical interrelationship.  My point of departure here is Bennett’s 
(1996) very persuasive defence of Foucault, in which she examines the various 
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conceptual elements of the charge of `aestheticization’ as it has been levelled 
against him, and finds his critics wanting on a number of counts.   
 
 
MUST WE BURN FOUCAULT?2 
In the first place, Bennett takes issue with the particular configuration of the 
`aesthetic’ which informs the complaint of `pan-aestheticism’.  In Eagleton (1990), 
Wolin (1986) and Norris (1992), she argues, the `aesthetic’ is invoked as a discourse 
of modernity, `as the province of a reactive, undisciplined sensuality’ (1996: 654), 
and as `an autonomous “realm” whose criteria of value are nonrational, amoral, and 
apolitical matters of beauty and style’ (ibid: 658).  It is not as though Foucault himself 
is consistent about the concept, or favours any one formulation of it.  As Thacker 
(1993) points out, his account is thoroughly ahistorical and makes no distinction 
between the Greek sense of `aesthetic’ as a socially located and ethical process of 
subjectivation, the Kantian notion of `aesthetic’ as `pure disinterestedness’, or 
Baudelaire’s `aesthetic’ as dandyism.  Nonetheless, despite Foucault’s own failure to 
specify the content of the `aesthetic’, Bennett’s point is that his critics tend to ignore 
Foucault’s emphasis on `askesis’, rather than `aesthetic’, as the organising focus of 
his ethics.  
 
Technologies of the self … permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the 
help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain 
state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality….  (This) implies certain 
modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of 
acquiring certain skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes (Foucault, 
1988a: 18 my emphasis). 
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In this passage, Foucault draws attention to an `aesthetic’ which is educable in terms 
of both the techniques and sensibilities required to enact and mobilise it.  The 
`aesthetic’, then, is not so much a realm of ideality, a psychic state or a stylish 
lifestyle, but is better understood as a culturally grounded process of subjectivation - 
an `askesis’ (or `asceticism’) - which, Bennett argues, is akin to `a disciplined form of 
sensuousness.  This aesthetics – aesthetics as sensibility-formation – has 
implications for ethics that are irreducible to fascism, hedonism, or 
indiscriminateness’ (1996: 654 original emphasis).   In other words, Bennett 
concludes, the connection between aesthetics and ethics depends upon how 
aesthetics is figured. So, the turn to Foucauldian ethics as a response to the 
perceived aestheticisation of auto/biographical practice, may not be as outrageous as 
it initially appears if we recognise that our engagement with auto/biography (as 
readers, writers, academicisers, publicists, critics) is integral to a process of 
sensibility-formation and the cultivation of an aesthetic disposition which is socially, 
politically and culturally encoded.  Foucault is very clear about this, and is quick to 
point out that the `care of the self’, in relation to Roman `aesthetics of existence’, is 
`not an exercise in solitude, but a true social practice’(1986: 51); talking of processes 
of subjectivation in Antiquity, Foucault regards these as `practices of liberation, of 
freedom … starting of course from a certain number of rules, styles and conventions 
that are found in the culture’ (1989a: 313); and elsewhere, with reference to 
`technologies of the self’ in modernity, he notes that `these (ascetic) practices are … 
not something that the individual invents by himself.  They are patterns that he finds 
in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, 
his society and his social group’ (1987: 122).   
 
Bennett’s second argument is to dismiss the common complaint that Foucault lacks a 
normative standpoint and is, at worst, a `moral nihilist’. This kind of critique, she 
suggests, confuses Foucault’s failure to place a command morality at the heart of his 
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ethics with the view that he rejects altogether the need for rules, prohibitions, 
doctrines and evaluative criteria.  Bennett is swift to remind us of Foucault’s 
recognition that ethics necessarily refer to elements of the code, and she draws 
attention to his assertion that: 
 
I had to keep in mind the distinction between the code elements of a morality and the 
elements of ascesis, neglecting neither their coexistence, their interrelations, their 
relative autonomy, nor their possible differences of emphasis … I am not supposing 
that the codes are unimportant (1985: 31-32). 
 
However, the key point here is that while Foucault recognises that ethics may refer to  
prescribed  rules of action, ethical conduct cannot be simply read off from the moral 
code associated with it - what is crucial is the `manner in which one ought to form 
oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that 
make up the code’ (Foucault, 1985: 26 my emphasis).  In short, moral principles are 
ethically insufficient3; referring to Greco-Roman nomoi (law and customs), Foucault 
argues that `more important than the content of the law and its conditions of 
application was the attitude that caused one to respect them’ (1985: 31 my 
emphasis).  Here, again, we encounter Foucault’s emphasis on sensibility-formation 
as the key dynamic of ethical practice wherein ‘there is … no forming of the ethical 
subject without “modes of subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self” 
that support them’ (ibid: 28).   On this analysis, auto/biographical practice, as an 
archetypal `technology of the self’, is indispensable to ethics and lies at the heart of 
the formation of an aesthetico-ethical sensibility which, far from negating the moral 
code, subjects it to qualification, problematisation and critique.  There is no `dark 
side’ to auto/biography in this formula, inhabited by a `capricious subjectivism’ and 
driven by the `pursuit of arbitrary whims’, so much as a reflexive `little space between 
morality and ethics’ (Connolly, 1998: 111).  
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Nonetheless, Foucault does not elaborate on how we ought to fill out this `little 
space’, and his critics remain dissatisfied (and unconvinced) by Foucault’s refusal to 
specify a normative content for his ethics.  McNay (1992: 87) suggests that 
Foucault’s most sustained consideration of normative substance is found in his essay 
What is Enlightenment? (1984b).  In this piece, Foucault regards Kant’s formulation 
of the Enlightenment as an attitude of critical self-awareness, as relevant to the 
formation of a modern ethics of the self; he also draws on Baudelaire’s work on 
dandyism to indicate the form that this critical self-awareness might take.  He refers, 
for example, to `the asceticism of the dandy who makes of his body, his behaviour, 
his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art’ (ibid: 41-42), and 
concludes that `(m)odern man …. is not the man who goes off to discover himself, 
his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself’ (ibid: 42).  
It is perhaps unfortunate that Foucault uses dandyism to illustrate a contemporary 
ethical-sensibility, as it has been invariably read as demonstrative of his preference 
for theatricality as a guiding principle of ethical action. This prompts Bennett (1996) to 
highlight a particular strand of critique – associated primarily with Wolin (1986, 1992) 
- which berates Foucauldian ethics for promoting not the content of ethical choice, 
but its dramatic and spectacular effects.  For Wolin, such an ethical position offers 
only one choice, that `of a glorious life which rides roughshod over the trammels of 
social respectability and convention’ (1986: 81).  From this perspective, Foucault’s 
aesthetics of existence are re-interpreted as `performative gesture’ (ibid: 74), 
‘provocative actions’, `narcissistic self-absorption’ or `outwardly directed, aggressive 
self-aggrandizement’ (ibid: 85); and his emphasis on critical reflexivity is re-read as 
as a `micropolitics of desire’  (Best and Kellner, 1991: 290) centred on the body and 
its pleasures. As Bennett puts it, `Foucault’s project of crafting a sensibility is reduced 
to an unreflective submission to the body.  Foucault’s aesthetics is thus stripped of its 
ascesis’ (1996: 662).  
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The representation of Foucault’s ethics as a self-centred, affective and embodied 
kind of vitalism is completely contrary to Foucault’s insistence that ethics requires a 
process of reflection not only about the relationship of self with self, but also of the 
relationship one has with others – more about this below.  In an interview in 1984, 
Foucault makes the important link between freedom, ethics and reflection, asserting 
that: 
 
… it is obvious that by liberating our desire that we will learn to conduct ourselves 
ethically … for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom ….  Freedom is the 
ontological condition of ethics.  But ethics is the considered form that freedom takes 
when it is informed by reflection (Foucault, 1994a: 284). 
 
Elsewhere, Foucault fleshes out some of the key principles of this reflective process; 
for example, in Power, Moral Values and the Intellectual, Foucault describes himself 
as a `moralist’ and lists `three elements in his “morals” … refusal, curiosity, 
innovation’ (1988b: 1).  By refusal, he enjoins us not to accept anything in our culture, 
social arrangements and experiences as self-evident, fixed or definitive.  Refusal is 
helped by attributes of curiosity and innovation; `I dream of a new age of curiosity’ 
(Foucault, 1994b: 325), he says, regarding curiosity as the capacity and concern to 
find strangeness in all those things in life which are seen as familiar, traditional, 
necessary, fundamental and important.  The corollary to curiosity is innovation, an 
ability to perpetually seek out new things to think about and imagine, and never 
resting content on acquired knowledge and beliefs.  This is an explicitly Nietzschean 
position: in Nietzsche’s words, `(w)e have to learn to think differently – in order at 
last, perhaps very late on, to attain even more: to feel differently’ (Nietzsche, 1982: 
104, aphorism 103, original emphasis).  In addition, Foucault regards refusal, 
curiosity and innovation as motivated by what he refers to as the `danger principle’; in 
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his elaboration of a genealogy of ethics, he describes such a disposition as the well-
spring of our ethical choices: 
 
My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous…  If everything 
is dangerous, then we always have something to do….  I think that the ethico-political 
choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger (1984a: 
343). 
 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, it may be the case that the `dark side’ of 
auto/biography is looking far less gloomy than at outset: but even if we accept that 
the reflexive, sensibility-forming and innovative qualities of reading/writing 
auto/biography have considerable ethical purchase, how far do Foucauldian ethics 
support `the life giving interaction between self-formation and responsible cultivation 
of our given social and cultural world’ (Weintraub, 1978: 379)?  Put another way, can 
Foucault’s ethical analytic also be pressed into the service of collective action, 
coalitions of resistance, political alliances and a shared commitment to social justice?  
Bennett points out how Foucault’s materialist critics are especially vexed by this 
issue.  Eagleton, for example, claims that `Foucault’s vigorously self-mastering 
individual remains wholly monadic.  Society is just an assemblage of autonomous 
self-disciplining agents, with no sense that their self-realisation might flourish within 
bonds of mutuality’ (1990: 393).  Best and Kellner (1991) and Callinicos (1989) 
accuse Foucault of failing to position his ethics within a wider analysis of the socio-
economic and cultural conditions of late modernity.   However, Bennett counters 
these criticisms by first, arguing that Foucault is not only insistent but consistent in 
his view that power is the condition of possibility of any form of subjectivity, and there 
can be no process of subjectivation outside of a regime of power.  Secondly, in 
response to Eagleton’s specific comment that Foucault has `no sense’ of the 
connection between self-formation, mutuality and collective action, Bennett reminds 
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us of the impossibility of self-realization given its embeddedness within  social 
relations.  Whatever the ideal of caring for or knowing the self, Foucault 
acknowledges that such a task is performed within a web of social constraints which 
always fail in their attempt to prevent `intersubjective bonds likely to disrupt the 
regime’ (Bennett, 1996: 660).  Besides this, Bennett notes Foucault’s rejection of 
rationalist politics, democratic institutions and public discourse as the privileged sites 
of self-determination, mutuality and/or resistance, and his preference for a model of 
self/other relations which emerge through tactical alliances, localised struggles and 
counter-hegemonic discursive practices. She further argues that Foucault’s critics not 
only fail to recognise their own inability to distill a universal ethics for social change 
and political transformation, but are also inattentive to the dangers and violences 
engendered by such an ambitious project; as Foucault quite scathingly asserts: 
 
Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle 
on which to base the elaboration of a new ethics.  They need an ethics, but they 
cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge 
of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on (1984a: 343).  
 
Bennett, then, concurs that within his ethical schema, Foucault’s `aesthetics of 
existence’ are best understood as `one of the means through which we improve the 
quality and generosity of our connectedness to others’ (1996: 661).  This point is very 
persuasively elaborated in Connolly’s (1998) 4 essay in which he draws on Foucault’s 
(1984a) genealogy of ethics to suggest four key dimensions of an ethical sensibility 
which, in combination, suggest the form which a Foucauldian `ethico-politico 
spirituality’ might take (ibid: 119). Firstly, Connolly talks of our propensity to unsettle 
the ontological necessity, inevitability and purity of established self/other dualities 
(such as identity/difference; innocent/guilty; normality/abnormality); secondly, he 
suggests the active cultivation of a capacity to recognise the ambiguity and 
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contingency of one’s identity; thirdly, he enjoins us to develop a generous sensibility 
to one’s difference from others, and to understand how that difference informs the 
definition of self-identity; and fourthly, he encourages the exploration of new 
possibilities in social relations opened up by a genealogy of the self.   
 
 
AUTO/BIOGRAPHY AND COLLECTIVE LIFE 
Despite the foregoing, I am still not convinced that auto/biographical work needs 
Foucauldian ethics to `rescue it’ from a twilight zone of narcissism.  It seems to me 
that the dystopian strand of critique is very narrowly predicated on the introspective 
and intrasubjective aspects of auto/biographical work and is preoccupied with the 
notion of self/selves as the organising concept of this narrative form5.  Indeed, this 
paper opened with the claim that the `narrative turn’ in general, and auto/biographical 
studies in particular, has reinvigorated critical thinking of the ontology of `the self’ and 
in so doing, has moved to the centre of contemporary sociologies of 
identity/subjectivity. Such a boast is hardly misplaced when Plummer (2001: 85) talks 
of `the search for the self’ as being the `hallmark’ of auto/biographical form. However, 
my opening assertion was swiftly followed by the qualifying acknowledgement that 
both academic theorisations and individuals’ discursive constructions of different 
selves necessarily involve an exploration of their connectedness to others both 
similarly and differentially located in time and space.  In this section, I want to unpack 
the self/other relations of auto/biographical work as a prelude to thinking about its 
intrinsic intersubjective and collectivising qualities.  
 
The notion of auto/biography as a discursive medium for expressing the interaction of 
the private worries and public concerns of an individual life is well-rehearsed, and 
there is a burgeoning field of scholarly analysis of the cultural politics generated by 
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auto/biographical narratives.  As Plummer notes of contemporary auto/biographical 
work, especially that produced by marginal, hidden and ordinary voices: 
 
The autobiographies `from below’ … work to create a different sense of 
autobiographical form, one where consciousness of self becomes more of a collective 
exploration than just a private one.  The author is somehow located as a member of a 
class, a gendered group, a generational group, an outcast group.  Indeed, these 
stories can transcend the traditional isolated `individual’ of classic autobiography  …  
to create a more collective awareness of others (2001: 90). 
 
To be sure, there is no shortage of academic commentary on how auto/biographical 
accounts promote the search for alliances that can serve as the basis for political and 
cultural liberation and transformation.  For example, in a highly original work, Pia 
Lara (1999, drawing on Arendt’s notion of `storytelling’ and Ricoeur’s ideas on 
mimesis, develops a critical analysis of feminist narrativity as the site of identity 
construction, recognition and reformulation, and shows how these kinds of `less-
rationalistic’ social practices and cultural productions come to the fore in the public 
sphere in localised struggles for justice.  Couser (1997) turns his attention to an 
emergent sub-genre of life-writing which he calls `autopathography’, a term which 
gives critical visibility to the diverse and compelling accounts of illness and disability 
that have appeared with increasing frequency over the last few decades.  By 
historicising `autopathographical narratives’ of breast cancer, HIV/AIDS, paralysis 
and hearing impairment, Couser’s study examines their resonance within 
contemporary liberation movements such as patients’ rights campaigns, positive 
identity politics and the counter-discursive movement against medical models of 
illness and disability.  A further example is found in Pouchet Paquet’s (2002) work on 
Caribbean auto/biography. The book deals with a wide range of topics within such 
auto/biography – such as the quest for an independent voice for the colonized 
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subject; the contested meanings of motherhood; the radicalization of Caribbean 
intellectuals – and through these tropes, Pouchet Paquet interrogates how writers 
negotiate the expression of public selves to realise different cultural possibilities for 
political practice.  This performative act, she suggests, results in both a collective and 
individual identity that serves as a locus of resistance against the corrosive powers of 
colonialism within the context of post-colonial Caribbean societies.  
 
However, in addition to their insights into the cultural politics and collective potential 
of auto/biographical practices, these kinds of studies not only complicate what is 
understood as an auto/biographical text but also expand our knowledge of the 
contexts within and the means by which `auto/biography’ may be produced.  In his 
identification of the moments when the narratives of silenced, outcast, marginal and 
hidden voices begin to emerge and take hold in the wider socio-political imagination, 
Plummer notes that: 
 
The backdrop to all this is the rise of a new series of technologies that are implicated 
in postmodern life.  The old low-tech is being shifted into the new hi-tech.  From print 
and sound recordings, through film and video, on to new digital forms – personal 
computing, web sites, CD-Roms, e-mail etc.; and ultimately towards lands only dimly 
sensed – cyberspace, virtual realities, medical scanning, the new genetics.  A new 
world of holography, satellites, cybernetics, fibre-optics, digitalism, and virtuality may 
start to re-order the forms in which our lives are assembled, displayed and stored 
(2001: 96). 
 
The transformation of the media at the end of the twentieth century is well-
documented and constitutes one of the most important social changes currently 
facing global societies (Miller, 1993, 1998; Stevenson, 1999; Lull, 2001; Kellner, 
1995, 2003).  As a condition of possibility for the promotion of self/other relations in 
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auto/biographical practices, the mediatised, digitalised, hi-tech, information age may 
be viewed with some optimism. Such a view takes comfort in a McLuhanist 
appreciation of the value and place of the `new’ media technologies within the public 
sphere.  While McLuhan’s theorisations of the `electronic society’ may be regarded 
as hopelessly optimistic, his ideas on the organic nature and temporal-spatial 
instantaneity of cultural and digital media – captured by his metaphor of the `global 
village’ – have done much to foster the view of these media as a `total field of 
interacting events in which all men (sic) participate’ (1994[1964]: 248). For McLuhan, 
the technological resources now available not only facilitate active citizenship in the 
`auto/biographical society’, but also transform social relations by bringing entire 
populations together in a complex, participatory and ritual process.  This is echoed by 
Scannell who insists that technological developments contribute to the 
`democratization of everyday life’ by rendering the world `ordinary, mundane, 
accessible, knowable, familiar, recognizable, shareable and communicable for whole 
populations’ (1989: 152 cited in Sparks, 1992: 17).  
 
However, this utopianism finds its nemesis in a Baudrillardian perspective which talks 
of the advent of a `hyperreality’ wherein the masses, caught up in a universe of 
simulation and multi-media massage, seek nothing more than spectacle, fantasy, 
diversion, entertainment and escape – an experience of pure effect and affect without 
content or meaning - see, for example, Baudrillard 1983, 1993, 1994. It is the kind of 
pessimistic stance taken up by Gabler who comments that in an era of highly 
mediatised cultural forms, we create our own lives as a film in which we become `at 
once performance artists in, and audiences for, a grand ongoing show’ (1998: 4).  
For Gabler, the practice of life-writing is transformed into an aesthetic process of 
entertainment acted out for the benefit of readers/audiences, and is reflective of the 
scripts of the wider media culture, its role models, fashion types, styles and looks. 
Under these dystopian conditions there is (almost) no prospect for an 
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auto/biographical politics marked by relations of resistance, coalition and mutuality.  
Indeed, to all intents and purposes, the harbingers of the `dark side’ would appear to 
have been right all along.  
 
The matter, however, cannot rest there.  Borrowing from Kellner’s (1994 - see also 
Best and Kellner, 1991) critique of Baudrillard, the pan-aestheticism of  `hyperreality’ 
mistakes a trend for a finality; it exaggerates the extent to which postmodern culture 
is modelled by processes of simulation; it is a thesis which would be more at home in 
a work of science fiction; and, above all, it constructs readers (viewers, listeners, 
consumers) as stupefied, passive, non-discriminating, cultural dopes.  On the other 
hand, though McLuhanism may be overly optimistic, there is a refusal here to turn the 
readership of auto/biographical texts to stone, and it celebrates the active, 
intersubjective and inherently political nature of reading practice.  Nonetheless, there 
is no further deconstruction of the `global village’ of  readers nor any account of how 
the `ethicality’ of auto/biographical work is realised within (and through) the 
contingency of reading practice.  Perhaps, then, all that is required to counter the 
(alleged) drift to narcissism and self-absorption, is to acknowledge and understand 
the ways in which ethical relations are forged by, in and through our contingent 
`readerly’ encounters with auto/biographical material.  Foucault may (still) be 
dispensable after all. 
 
 
READING AUTO/BIOGRAPHY 
(Within auto/biography) …reading remains invisible as a topic for serious theoretical 
discussion.  Reading is instead taken as a pre-theoretical given, a transparent act in 
relation to a totally active text which is apparently productive of one obvious and 
incontrovertible reading.  What is needed instead is a discussion of reading as an 
active engagement with a text and so as a viewpoint contingent upon the 
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epistemological and ontological position of a reader and thus of her autobiography, 
such as has taken place within ethnomethodologically-informed sociology (Stanley, 
1992 : 100 Original emphasis). 
 
Stanley is an exception to the analytical blindspot which she draws attention to in this 
passage.  Throughout her book, The Auto/biographical I, she explicitly engages with 
the activity of reading, conceptualising both the practices and the person of the 
auto/biographical reader(s).  In these pages we are introduced to `active readers, 
knowledgeable readers’ (1992: 116) who bring to the text their own `auto/biographies 
and the tools, means and knowledges these provide’ (ibid: 84).  There is a greater 
sense of a division (and balance) of auto/biographical labour in this perspective; it is 
not a question of de-centring either the text (or its author) in favour of the reader, so 
much as recognising how auto/biographical texts facilitate their interaction and serve 
as socio-discursive prisms or conduits through which ethical relationships between 
writing selves and reading others may be negotiated and formed.  However, there is 
no guarantee that such relationships will aspire to bonds of mutuality or coalitions of 
resistance.  As Stanley rightly points out: 
 
We may be textually persuaded, cajoled, led and misled; but we can, and we do, also 
scrutinise and analyse, puzzle and ponder, resist and reject.  Readers, then, form a 
discriminating audience, one with its own understandings; and it is a fragmented 
audience … a large number of people who multiply engage in its largely solitary 
virtues and vices (ibid: 131). 
 
This quotation neatly captures the epistemological insights of a broad 
interdisciplinary literature which talks of the relationship between writers and readers 
and how this is mediated by particular and socially-contextualised readings of the 
text. While different theorists have approached the issue in different ways, depending 
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on the kinds of texts examined - including film, best-selling novels, television drama, 
newspaper reports, television documentaries, academic ethnographies – they share 
the view that connections between the writing self and reading other are anchored in 
a text which reflects readers’ `own frame of reference’ so that they come to `share 
the perspective of the text’ (Atkinson, 1990: 15). Eco sums this up well: he states, `to 
make his (sic) text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble of 
codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by his possible reader’ (1979: 7).  
Put another way, he argues that narrative strategies `make us fond’ by drawing on 
`the common opinions shared by the majority of readers’ (ibid: 161); they invite co-
operation by appealing to shared values; by deploying a `common frame’ and an 
`intertextual frame’ of references and inferences (ibid: 20-21); and by mobilising a 
`patrimony of knowledge’ (Eco, 1972 cited in Sparks, 1992: 111).  As Atkinson (1990: 
2) has argued, `we read, and read into the text based on our own background 
knowledge and assumptions’; while Freund (1987) suggests that a text has gaps, 
and in the act of reading, the reader clarifies the ambiguities - `the reader is free to fill 
in the blanks but is at the same time constrained by the patterns supplied in the text; 
the text proposes and instructs, and the reader disposes or constructs’ (Freund, 
1987: 142 cited in Rosenau, 1992: 38).  These insights confirm reading practice as 
an active process which involves a continual search for coherence between the 
narrative and other dimensions of readers’ beliefs, consciousness and values.  
Where there is no coherence, then readers may adopt either an `oppositional 
position’, and retotalize the narrative within an alternative frame of reference (Hall, 
1992: 138), or a `negotiated position’ which is `shot through with contradictions’ (ibid: 
137).  What is emphasised here is the ideological import of narrative texts, and 
therefore their implications to the reproduction of existing power relations including, 
within this, a reinforcement of relations of resistance. 
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Despite the prominence of these theoretical perspectives within narrative studies and 
notwithstanding my own use of them elsewhere (Campbell, 2004a, 2004b), I have 
reservations on their analytical value to questions of `ethicality’.  While readers may 
be conceptualised as active participants in their connectivity with authors/writers, and 
the contingency of their socio-political locations is acknowledged, there is no 
potential within these frameworks for thinking about movements or shifts in readers’ 
originating consciousness and dispositions.  Rather, readers are supposed as pre-
formed individuals, always-already disposed to a particular reading; ethical relations 
appear to be fixed, static and inert with no possibility that readers’ ethical positions 
could (somehow) change and new or different self/other relations be forged.  
 
 
AN ETHICS OF BECOMING 
This leads us, then, back into the heart of Foucauldian territory where ethicality is not 
a matter of subscribing to or being tolerant of a particular authorial value-position, but 
is a dynamic process of sensibility-formation which starts as a problematisation of 
ourselves as readers of others’ auto/biographical accounts.  For Connolly, tolerance 
may be an admirable quality, but it is suggestive of a benevolence to others amidst 
the stability of our own identities; what is required is an `ethos of critical 
responsiveness’ (1999: 62) which involves active work on our current identities in 
order to modify the terms of our relationship to others.  Such an ethos foregrounds 
the affective forces of ethical experience; it is an analytic which is less interested in 
forms of being - that is, being persuaded by, resistant to, rejecting and/or tolerant of 
difference – and more concerned with those visceral and moving encounters which 
initiate other possibilities for subjectivity and intersubjectivity, an aesthetic response 
which Connolly refers to as a `movement of becoming’ (ibid: 57-62).  Connolly 
suggests that a `politics of becoming’ is (even) locatable within the highly polarised 
debates surrounding capital punishment where there is little scope for a compromise 
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position which satisfies the different moral standpoints of those who are pro- and 
those who are anti- the death penalty.  However, the opposing fundamentalisms 
generated by capital punishment, whether represented as political, moral, cultural or 
symbolic dichotomies, are also played out on a visceral register of experience and 
are energised by affective, aesthetic and emotional forces which are as important for 
our ethical encounters with state-sanctioned execution as are categorical imperatives 
grounded in morality, law and reason.  Yet, and ironically, this aesthetico-ethical 
dimension is continually suppressed as if by its very articulation rational-moral 
perspectives on capital punishment, on either side of the debate, would be lost 
forever.  At a time when some penal activists suggest that the public is no longer 
moved by `reasoned’ debates on the death penalty (see, for example, Boutellier, 
2000; Lilly, 2002), we should embrace the potential for cultivating and enacting an 
aesthetico-ethical sensibility through alternative media of which auto/biography is but 
one example.   
 
Consider, for example, the auto/biography of Sister Helen Prejean, Dead Man 
Walking (1994), which records her work with two prisoners on death row at Louisiana 
State Penitentiary, Angola, LA. This single text stimulated an extensive subsidiary 
media which included the 1995 production of an Oscar-winning Hollywood film of the 
same title.  This, in turn, has prompted a heated, interactive and ongoing discussion 
amongst film-goers posted on the Internet Movie Database (IMDb)6.  At the same 
time, a compelling documentary, `Angel on death row’, aired as part of PBS’s7 
Frontline series on 9 April, 1996, was quick to generate viewers’ comments leading 
to the online publication of both the programme scripts and its research materials8.  
This kind of media incites Foucault’s sense of danger and curiosity – Hollywood film, 
online discussions, television documentary, journalistic research, televisual scripts all 
fall within the shadow of a `hyperreality’ which, by virtue of its conceptualisation as a 
world of simulation and false appearances, is said to pose dangers for ethicality.  But 
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what are we to make of the response to the `hyperrealised’ incarceration and 
execution of the `factional’ character of Matthew Poncelet9; it certainly seems to have 
moved the viewers of Dead Man Walking and Frontline’s `Angel on death row’; 
viewer-discussants note: 
 
This film will emotionally grab and shake both those who oppose the death penalty, as 
well as those in favour of it’ (SmileysWorld: IMDb posted 3 October 1999: Emphasis 
added) 
 
At the very least, Dead Man Walking makes you reflect on why you feel the way you 
do . (Garp, Austin, Texas, US: IMDb posted 12 March 2001: Emphasis added).   
 
Dead Man Walking drew me away from the edge of this dilemma and left me in the 
center … a position I find to be very uncomfortable’ (Frontline Feedback, Robert 
Jordan, Chicago, Illinois, US: Emphasis added).   
 
It (Dead Man Walking) is worth seeing if only to get the viewer to confront his/her 
thoughts on death and the death sentence’ (Matthew Ignoffo, Eatontown, New Jersey, 
US: IMDb posted 7 March 2002: Emphasis added) 
 
These comments indicate a critical responsiveness marked by an aesthetics of 
emotionality and bodily experiences – viewers are `grabbed’, `shaken’ and feel `very 
uncomfortable’.  Moreover, these embodied sensations are not disconnected from 
reflective processes, but are reported here as prompting an awareness of the 
contestability of viewers’ existing perspectives, not only stimulating a re-imagination 
of their moral standpoints but also provoking a confrontation with their current school 
of thought.  This unsettling is stirred by a different kind of encounter with `death’, 
`dying’ and the `dead’  than that proposed by political and moral discourse on capital 
punishment.  Where rational debate concerns itself with the philosophical, judicial 
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and technical aspects of the death penalty, Dead Man Walking encourages viewers 
to experience `life/death’ (`living/dying’) as a human drama of corporeal, affective and 
aesthetic relationships which, according to one viewer, `captures the very soul of the 
human condition’ (Dawn-49, US: IMDb posted 12 June 2002).   
 
In a speech which formed part of a community discussion on the death penalty, 
Sister Prejean reflected on Tim Robbins’ transformation of her book into film; she 
said: 
 
…  it’s not a polemic.  It’s a form of art and in art what you do is you bring people to a 
place and present it to them in a way that their hearts can respond in a way they 
never have before’ (Prejean, 1996:Emphasis added). 
 
Here, again, is a clear reference to an aesthetic sensibility which makes possible a 
line of flight away from entrenched beliefs and principled positions.  This is not the 
same as saying that Dead Man Walking prompts some widespread moral 
conversion, but that it creates an opportunity for ethical reflexivity.  Compare this to 
the ethical potential of a documentary film released in the same year, Executions 
(1995); directed by David Herman and Arun Kumar, the promotional material for 
Executions described it thus: `This objective documentary on the death penalty and 
state sponsored killing looks at the social, political and moral impact of these 
methods of death’ (IMDb, accessed 18 March 2008)10.  There is no indication here 
that viewers will be `moved’ or brought to a `different place’, so much as be 
presented with a series of visual, historical and contemporary `facts’ about capital 
punishment from which they can be expected to form a rational, dispassionate 
perspective on the issue. Indeed, as one viewer commented, `(t)his is an interesting 
documentary focusing on the subject of the death penalty and the execution of 
human beings …. but overall it wasn’t disturbing’ (Afracious, England: IMDb posted 
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15 June 2001).  This is certainly very different from the effusive hyperbole of the bill-
boarding which launched Dead Man Walking.  For example, the DVD (cover) 
promoted the film as `fast-moving and absorbing … filled with genuine suspense that 
will leave you awe-struck from beginning to end’; and it quoted from the British film 
magazine, Empire, to claim that `God, death, guilt, hope, truth, right, wrong, 
Springsteen and brilliant, brilliant acting (is) all crammed into 2 hours’.  At the same 
time, the TV commercial for Dead Man Walking reminded viewers that: 
 
Rolling Stone calls Dead Man Walking one of the year’s 10 best films … brilliant on 
every level …. Susan Sarandon and Sean Penn set the screen on fire …. Tim 
Robbins has directed an extraordinary film’ (Dead Man Walking DVD [1995]: Special 
Features/ TV Commercial) 
 
In other words, whereas Executions anticipates a soberly, contemplative viewing 
audience11, Dead Man Walking is promoted as a cinematic commodity, as an artistic 
tour de force, and as an aesthetic event which is there to be experienced rather than 
cogitated by the film-going public.   However, despite the hyperreality of the 
Hollywood razzamatazz which surrounds the film, according to its audience, Dead 
Man Walking, without any political grandstanding, tabloid moralising or resort to 
sensationalism, nonetheless prompts an askesis which has ethical potential – a feat 
which Executions patently failed to achieve.  A viewer-discussant makes the point 
very elegantly; s/he writes: 
 
Robbins has successfully captured Sister Prejean’s emotional and turbulent journey 
succinctly, while managing to keep it devoid of any maudlin sentimentality, which 
makes it not only real, credible and believable, but makes it a poignant and thoroughly 
emotionally involving experience for the audience …. It is doubtful that this film will 
change anyone’s mind one way or another about the death penalty, but that was 
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never the intention; what was intended, was to make a thought-provoking, emotionally 
intense film, which is exactly what Robbins has accomplished with Dead Man Walking 
(JHClues, Salem, Oregon, US: IMDb posted 18 November 2001). 
 
On this view, even when auto/biographical work is explicitly aetheticised as 
entertainment, it holds out the promise for an ethics of becoming.  There may be, 
then, a persuasive case to be made for embracing the emergence of an 
auto/biographical society, and good ground for celebrating its (assumed) cultures of 
narcissism.  Rather than regarding such cultures as marking a descent into a self-
absorbed `capricious subjectivism’ we might instead recognise how these constitute 
meaningful, shareable and mediated contexts in which relational techniques of the 
self can flourish, thereby opening up the potential for realising a different kind of 
ethical relation to ourselves and others.    
 
 
CONCLUSION 
According to Foucault, his project on the self had actually been inspired by a reading 
of Christopher Lasch’s The Culture of Narcisism (1978) – see Martin et al, (1988: 4); 
but while Lasch remained disillusioned by the turn to self in modernity, Foucault’s 
genealogical investigations of the historical continuity of the care and technologies of 
the self, provided an important counterpoint – or even antidote – to Lasch’s 
pessimistic outlook of an imminent descent into a narcissistic void.   In many ways, 
then, there should have been little need to `rehabilitate’ Foucault and defend him 
from accusations of peddling a solipsistic kind of ethics.  Nonetheless, by unpacking 
some of the core assumptions made about Foucault’s aesthetics of existence, and 
then moving the concept of askesis to centre-stage of the Foucauldian analytic, this 
discussion has reasserted Foucault’s emphasis on sensibility-formation as the 
mainspring of an ethical attitude and thereby reunited the `care of the self’ with the 
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social.  Restating the self as a signifier of sociality – or, as Bennett (2007) puts it, a 
`working surface on the social’ - not only challenges prevailing sociological 
theorisations of the relationship of self and society, but also re-imagines the terms 
and conditions of ethicality in a number of important ways.  Firstly, it unsettles the 
commonplace counterposition of private and public life, and their relatively 
unquestioned alignment with, on the one hand, an aesthetic world of desire, 
corporeal stylization and autocentric indulgence, and on the other, an ethical sphere 
of collective action, reasoned debate and the pursuit of social justice.   From this 
premise the turn to the self as evidenced in the proliferation of contemporary cultural 
practices such as body-piercing, dieting, cosmetic surgery, auto/biography, should 
not be viewed as an inherently `anti-social’, individualistic and narcissistic 
development, but as a condition of possibility for nurturing an aesthetically-initiated 
and socially-grounded sensibility to oneself and others.   
 
Secondly, conventional notions which insist on the separation of the aesthetic from 
the ethico-political (and scientific) realms of human existence, are problematised 
within an analytic which recognises their dialectical and reflexive interrelationship.   
Thus, to celebrate and embrace an aesthetics of existence is not to abandon ethics 
and reason to the wind but is to enable alternative ways of living together to flourish.  
The aesthetic in this schema does not contaminate or colonize the ethical so much 
as subject it to scrutiny and qualification; in other words, the aesthetic provides the 
critical leverage to question our sense of self-identity and to foster a sensibility to our 
difference from others, thereby encouraging new social and political relations to 
develop.  A third effect of repositioning Foucault’s technologies of the self within the 
centre ground of political and ethical life is their invigorating impact on how (and 
where) we look to foster socio-cultural relations of mutuality, coalition and alliance.  
That is, if we accept Foucauldian ethics qua ethics, rather than regard them as an 
incitement to pan-aetheticism, it permits us to jettison wellworn debates on the 
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relative merits of universality over particularity in ethical principles, in favour of a 
more imaginative approach to community living and civic direction.  So, rather than 
look to canonical maxims, moral injunctions and legal codes for normative guidance, 
our ethical citizenship is prompted by curiosity, innovation, refusal and a sense of 
danger, most especially in terms of a problematisation of our-selves and a 
questioning of the (self-)identities to which we have become attached.  It is precisely 
this kind of ethos which is encouraged by the `autobiographical society’.  Thus, and 
finally, far from promoting a narcissistic culture, the proliferation of auto/biography 
contributes to what Foucault describes as `an overabundance of things: fundamental, 
terrible, wonderful, funny, insignificant, and crucial at the same time’ (Foucault, 
1994b: 325).  In this case we should embrace the emergence of a globalised, and 
largely aetheticised cultural and digital media which not only permit different 
technologies of the self to flourish, but which also enable us to `act as intermediaries 
between this mass of things and this thirst for (ethical) knowledge’ (ibid: 325).  
 
 
NOTES 
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Scottish and Northern 
Narratives Network Conference, University of Edinburgh, 9 December 2005.  I 
am grateful to conference participants for their helpful comments and feedback 
on the paper.  I am also very grateful to the anonymous reviewers of Cultural 
Sociology for their constructive contributions to this article. 
2. This is taken directly from Vintges (2001) article `Must we burn Foucault?’ ethics 
as art of living: Simone de Beauvoir and Michel Foucault’.  In turn, Vintges refers 
to, and paraphrases de Beauvoir’s essay, Must we burn de Sade? (1953) to 
indicate that her article offers something of an apology for Foucault in the same 
way that de Beauvoir sought to defend de Sade. 
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3. Bennett’s organising problematic (captured in the title of her article) is framed by 
a question initially posed by Friedrich Schiller ([1967[1794]: 51) - `how is it, then, 
that we still remain barbarians?’ given the promise of a practical ethics informed 
by Enlightenment rationality. The co-existence of rational enlightenment and 
ethical barbarism, for Schiller, suggests that ethics requires more than reason as 
a guide to conduct.  In Bennett’s words `(e)thics requires not only rational 
principles of behaviour but the perceptual refinement to apply them to particular 
cases and the disposition or will to live them out.  For Schiller, that will is an 
aesthetic product, to be cultivated by disciplining and refining one’s sensitivity to 
beauty’ (1996: 654-655 original emphasis).  
4. This essay was first published in Political Theory, Volume 21(3): 365-389 (1993). 
5. Reynolds’ (2001) edited volume on auto/biography in the Arabic literary tradition 
deals with the problem of defining Arabic auto/biography against a background of 
Western theorising of the genre.  In tracing the history of a `thousand years of 
Arabic auto/biography’, and in summarising its main features, the contributors to 
this innovative text expose the fallacy of the western origins of auto/biography 
and the contestability of western notions of the genre’s (perceived) generic 
aspects, such as narrativising processes of individuation, the revelation of 
personal and private aspects of life, and expressions of inner self. 
6. These can be accessed at: www.imdb.com/title/tt0112818/usercomments 
7. PBS is a US public affairs television company 
8. These can be accessed at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/angel/ 
9. The character of Matthew Poncelet, played by actor Sean Penn, is largely 
understood to be a composite of the biographies of the first two men Sister Helen 
Prejean counselled on death row – Elmo Patrick Sonnier and Robert Lee Willie.  
According to Buchanan (1996), Poncelet captures Sonnier’s crime and Willie’s 
character. 
10. Details of Executions (1995) can be found at: www.IMDb.com/title/tt0150490 
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11. This does not suggest that the documentary genre cannot also be experienced 
aesthetically (and ethically).  See, especially, Hawkins’ (2001) critical Deleuzian 
exposition of how far and in what ways contemporary televisual documentary is 
implicated in the shaping of our ethical sensibilities. 
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